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A reporter's goal is to obtain the truth from his sources 
so that he can ~ccurately report the news to the public in the 
stories that he writes. However, because controversy is often 
at the heart of the story a reporter is writing, sources of 
information may become scarce -- especially human sources, who 
for many reasons, may be afraid to reveal the truth because 
the information they provide may be attributed to them. 
To overcome this difficult dilemma, news reporters confronted 
with this situation will often grant their sources confidentiality. 
When a reporter promises his source that anonymity will be 
granted, a source then is more likely to reveal information 
which he wouldn't otherwise divulge. 
Because the stories in which a news reporter must grant 
confidentiality to sources often are about illegal activities 
such as organized crime and drug rings, police investigations 
often result, and eventually, a reporter may be subpoenaed to 
testify at a trial. 
As in some recent cases, reporters have held firm in 
their refusal to disclose sources of information on the grounds 
that without such a privilege to withhold this information, 
sources would dry up, and as a result, reporters would ultimately 
be unable to keep the public well-informed. 
It is absolutely essential that reporters have this privilege 
so that they call gather information in the best interest of the 
public. The press has traditionally been viewed as a participant 




nickname, the Fourth Estate implies. Not only does the press 
playa role of an adversary of the government, but it also serves 
as a "watchdor," [or the people to guard against the abuses of 
those in power. 
Therefore, throughout the last few years, a conflict has 
arisen between [Iews reporters granting confidentiality to sources 
and the nE'ed of a court to gather information so that a fair 
trial may be cCJ:luucted. There has been a documented increase 
in the number of subpoenas to reporters asking them to reveal 
both confidential sources of information reported in a story 
and also for confidential information itself. 
This conflict puts the First Amendment and the Sixth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution at odds. For in one is the 
freedom of the press involving the protection of confidential 
news sources, but on the other side is the right of an accused 
person to confront witnesses against him and to find witnesses 
in his favor. Because both of these amendments carry equal 
weight and neither is superior to the other, the outcomes of 
cases tried by the courts are varied and are judged according 
to the balance of societal issues on an individual basis. 
From this framework, a newsman's privilege has been 
developed in many states. This privilege grants immunity.to 
a newsman when testifying in court, allowing him the right not 
to divulge confidential sources or confidential information. 





About 26 states have passed shield laws which protect 
reporters from revealing information and sources consulted in 
the news-gathering process. Some of these laws are absolute 
while others arc qualified or restrictive, but all have been 
based on the assumption that if the government can mandate that 
journalists reveal confidential sources, people who have important 
information but who fear repercussions from being identified 
"ill remain si1cnt, causing a "chilling effect" which ultimately 
deprives the p\lblic of essential information. 
Classifying state shield laws as either absolute or qualified 
has been misleading, for in some instances, la"s have been 
assumed to be absolute by those who drafted them, but the courts 
have deemed them otherwise. The first shield law "as passed 
by Maryland in 1896. Seven shield laws "ere legislated in the 
1930s, four resulted during the 1940s and four were developed 
in the 1960s. ~ine states -- Dela"are, Illinois, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Ne" York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Tennessee -- have adopted shield laws since 1970. (Council 
of State Governments, 1973) But since the original statutes 
"ere passed, many have been amended as court decisions raised 
additional issues about shield la" formulation. 
For example, Indiana and Ne" Mexico amended their la"s 
in 1973 to extend the privilege to former reporters because 
of a court decision "hich denied privilege to William Farr 
because he "as no longer a reporter. California also amended 
its privilege la" in 1971 to account for that decision. (Council, 
1973) 
-,-
Shield law legislation was introduced in more than half of 
the state legislatures during 1973, but less than half of the 
legislation drafted was adopted. (Council, 1973) The increase 
in investigative reporting ocntributed to this increase in 
enact'ing law of this effect, according to conclusions made 
by a 1973 study by the Council of State Governments. The U.S. 
Congress has also considered shield law legislation and held 
hearings on tho topic, although no federal shield law has 
ever been passed. 
Proponents of federal shield law say the commerce clause 
grants the federal government the power to regulate and protect 
interstate comrr:'lnications. In addition, many say that uniformity 
in this type of law is needed to avoid conflicts among state 
shield laws. Another argument made by those in favor of federal 
shield laws is that because half of the states have already 
enacted shield legislation, this serves as evidence for the need 
of a federal statute. 
Some oppose federal shield laws on the basis that the rules 
of evidence in state courts be regulated under the commerce 
clause would be unconstitutional. Opponents also contend that it 
is not appropriate that Congress should use a federal law to 
dispose of press subpoenas, especially since the Supreme Court 
held a shield to be a procedural right rather than a fundamental 
right. 
Court cases involving a reporter's right to not reveal 
confidential SOllrces or confidential information have raised 
a great many questions including: Whom, exactly, should the 
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shield law prolf'ct? For journalists, whose professional and 
personal lives ~re often inseparable, what information is 
protected and wllat isn't? and Is the shield law vulnerable 
to abuse? 
Shield laws are often criticized; the laws themselves 
are not so often the object of this criticism, but more often 
the interpretations of the laws by the courts. Courts have 
repeatedly brought to light more loopholes in many of the 
state statutes. 
Because of the uncertainty of the boundaries of shield 
laws enacted by many states, and also because of the question 
of whether or not a federal statute is needed to resolve the 
diversity among the state laws, I will attempt to review the 
history of the shield laws, review their original intent, 
and examine their purpose. 
I will also review many of the cases in which state 
shield laws have been put to test, along with the outcomes 
and the assuQptions of judges who heard the cases. I will 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the present legis la-
tion, and finally, propose some viable solutions for creating 
a more standard shield law which could serve as a model for 
adoption among states, or ultimately, by the federal govern-
ment. 
HISTORICAL OVER~IEW 
Confidentiality and privileged communication is not a new 
question of law. As far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 
the confidential relationship between a lawyer and his client 
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was recognized ~nd protected by law. (Overbeck, Pullen, 1985) 
British common law also recognized an equivalent privilege 
between husband and wife. 
Legislation in the United States, following much of the 
British pattern, has also granted privilege to these rela-
tionships. American law has even extended confidential 
privilege statutes to included relationships such as 
clergy/parishoncr, physician/patient, and informant/govern-
ment. (Francois. 1978) 
The statutory approach to news reporters' privilege has 
been on a state by state basis rather than on a federal level. 
Maryland Has the first state to pass a reporter's privilege 
statute in 1896 following and incident involving a ~~l!l~£E~ 
- ~~~ reporter. (Steigleman, p. 196) The reporter was sent to 
jail for contempt of a grand jury after the reporter refused 
to reveal a source of information which allowed him to 
accurately predict a pending indictment. (Steigleman, p. 196) 
Now, more than 91 years later, over one-half of the 50 
Un i ted S t c. t e s 'u v e s hie 1 d 1 a H s. Man y 0 f the 26 law s tv ere d r aft e d 
and enacted in lirect response to a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
handed down in Paul M. John P. (1972). 
A number at the 26 state shield laHs provide journalists 
a significant ~~aunt of legal protection against revealing 
confidential sources of information and confidential informa-
tion itself. In most cases, in fact, journalists are relieved from 
compulsory testimony about a confidential source of information 
in any legal proceeding. 
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-- About half of the shield laws in existence today stipulate 
a qualified privilege rather than an absolute privilege. This 
means that the news reporters' privilege is not viewed as 
superior to other interests but rather that it is balanced 
Hith the overriding public interest weighing <'-gainst the ability 
to carry out justice. 
Varying conditions in each of the 26 shield laws have made 
it nearly impossible for one to predict its interpretation 
prior to a test in the judiciary process. For instance, in 
1975 New Mexico's state Legislature passed shield legislation, 
but the law was declared unconstitutional by the state's 
Supreme Court oilly a year later in Ammerman v. Hubbard 
!E£~~£~~l!~I' Inc. (1976). The court ruled that the shield 
- law was an "interference with judicial prerogatives concerning 
evidence." (Gillrnor, Barron, 1984, p. 402) Hence, what may 
appear as a "strong" shield law or a nearly absolute piece of 
legislation may be substantially weakened or even obliterated 
by the cot:.rts. 
Shield laKs have been typically categorized into one of 
the three following groups: 1) absolute privilege laws, which 
seemingly eXCUS2 a reporter from ever revealing a news source 
in any type of legal proceeding or inquiry; 2) laws that 
only apply the privilege if information derived from the 
source is actually published or broadcast; and 3) qualified 
or limited privilege laws, Hhich may have one or many excep-
-
tions, often alloHing the courts to disregard them under 
certain circumstances. (Overbeck, Pullen, 1985) A few 
--
examples of th0 varying statutes to illustrate the diversity 
of the 26 shield laws now in existence: 
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In the Arkansas shield law, the news reporter's privilege 
is not absolute. The statute stipulates that the privilege 
may be revoked if it is demonstrated that the article (written 
or broadcast) teas "Hritten, published or broadcast in bad 
faith, Hith malice, and not in the interest of the public 
welfare." (Gora, 1974, p. 244) 
Indiana's code extends the neHS reporter's privilege to 
protect "the source of any information procured or obtained 
in the course of (the reporter's) employment" Hhether or not 
it was published or broadcast. This state's privilege also 
extends specifically to former reporters. (Gora, 1974, p. 245) 
The Louisiana statute offers a neHS reporter's privilege 
to protect "the identity of any informant or any source of 
information obtained by (the reporter) from another person 
Hhile acting as a reporter," except that after a hearing, a 
court may "fino that the disclosure is essential to the public 
interest." ( G (l l' a, 1 9 7 4, p. 2 4 5 ) 
Illinois' privilege also protects a confidential source 
of information or confidential information obtained by a 
reporter. However, the laH is conditional, stating that a 
court may divest the reporter of the privilege after con-
sideration of "nature of the proceedings, the merits of the 
claim of defense, the adequacy of the remedy otherwise 
available, if any, the relevancy of the source, and the 
possibility of establishing by other means that Hhich it 
.--
-
alleged the source requested will tend to prove," if the 
court determines "that all other available sources of infor-
mation have been exhausted and disclosure of the information 
sought is essential to the protection of the public interest 
involved." This law is also extended to anyone who was a 
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reporter at the time the information was sought and obtained. 
(Gora, 1974, p. 244) 
In Delaware, a reporter's privilege protects a source 
or the content of information a reporter gains within the 
scope of his professional activities, except that during 
adjudicative proceedings, a condition is required to allow 
the information to remain confidential. The first is that 
the reporter lIlUC;! first ~,tate under oath that "the disclosure 
of the information would violate an express or implied under-
standing with the source" or would hinder maintenance and 
development of source relationships. The second stipulation 
is that the content is no longer privileged "if the judge 
determines that the public interest in having the reporter's 
testimony ~utwei0hs the public interest in keeping the infor-
mation confidential. (Gora, 1974, p. 244) 
Other state statutes are less complicated. Michigan's 
shield law states "communications between reporters of news-
papers or other pUblications and their informants are 
privileged and confidential." (Gora, 1974, p. 245) 
The excerpts from a few of the 26 state statutes offering 
some type of reporter's privilege demonstrate the broad range 




Many still argue that there is no need for state shield 
laws because tlle First Amendment should be interpreted broadly 
enough to provide an absolute privilege to reporters. However, 
courts to date have not ruled in favor of this broad-based 
interpreta.tion. 
1972) 
No federal legislation has been enacted into law although 
attempts were made following the Supreme Court ruling in the 
Branzburg case in 1972. However, the Department of Justice 
has adopted guidelines which define when and how a United 
States attorney can issue a subpoena against a working reporter. 
The following is a summary of the federal guidelines (Pember, 
1984, p. 305): 
"I. The Dr,partment of Justice must attempt to strike a 
balance between the public's interest in the free dissemination 
of ideas and i~formation and the public interest in effective 
law enforcement when determining whether to seek a subpoena 
for a journalist's confidential information. 
2. All rc~sonable attempts should be made to obtain the 
information fro~ alternative sources before considering issuing 
a subpoena to a member of the news media. 
3. Kegoti~tions with the news media to gain the informa-
tion which is sought shall be pursued in all cases in which a 
subpoena to a member of the news media is contemplated. 
4. If the negotiations fail (if the reporter won't 
provide the material voluntarily), the attorney general must 
approve the subnoena based on the following guidelines: 
a. There must be sufficient evidence of a crime from a non-
press source. The department does not approve of using 
reporters as springboards for investigation. 
b. The i~formation the reporter has must be essential to a 
successful investigation -- not peripheral or speculative. 
c. The government must have unsuccessfully attempted to get 
the information from an alternative non-press source. 
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d. Great caution must be exercised with respect to subpoenas 
for unpublished information or where confidentiality is alleged. 
e. Even subpoenas for published information must be treated 
with care because reporters have encountered harrassment on 
the grounds that information collected will be available to 
the government. 
f. The subpoena must be directed to specific information." 
(Pember, 1984, p. 305) 
So, with this summary it is evident that the federal 
government does equate some privilege to confidential infor-
mation obtained by reporters. 
Since there is no real consistency between reporters' 
privilege statutes from one state to another, a review of 
some legal precedents set through the last few decades is 
necessary to provide a framework from which an extensive 
analysis of shield law legislation can be synthesized. 
12 
- FARR V. SUPERIOR COURT (1971) 
This case demonstrates the loopholes in shield laws 
which can result in serious repercussions for journalists 
who invoke them to protect their sources. Hilliam Farr \-Jas 
was assigned to cover the trial of Charles Manson and his 
followers for tile murders of actress Sharon Tate and many 
others. (Overb~ck, Pullen, 1985) During this trial, a 
restrictive or Cag order was applied so that trial participants 
\-Jere barred from releasing the content of any testimony given. 
Although this restrictive order \-Jas issued, t\-JO of the 
six attorneys g~ve Farr a copy of a statement made by a possible 
\-Jitness for the prosecution. The statement detailed that Manson 
- had intended to torture and murder numerous show business 
celebrities, in addition to containing a confession to some 
of the crimes that she and the rest of the Manson group \-Jere 
being tried for. 
Farr published a story in the Herald-Examiner as a result 
of the information he received from attorneys, and after the 
Manson trial was over, the trial judge, Charles Older, called 
for a special hearing to find out \-Jho had leaked the informa-
tion to Farr. Farr was summoned to divulge the source of the 
"leaked" statement, but he refused on the basis of the Cal-
ifornia shield law. At this point in time, Farr's defense 
appeared to be satisfactory to the judge. 
-
Later on, Judge Older summoned Farr once again to reveal 
the source of information for his story. At the time of the 
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second summons, Farr was no longer a reporter for the ~!E!!~= 
Examiner but was now a special investigator for the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney. Farr again refused to comply with 
the judge's request, although the judge said that the California 
shield law protected only currently employed reporters, and 
because he refused to comply, he was cited for contempt of court. 
Following this citation pronounced by the court, the case 
was complicated even further, with a series of legal tactics 
which dragged on for more than 10 years. In 1972, a California 
court of appeals issued a ruling which made an exception to 
the state's shield law. It stated that the state's shield law 
was inapplicable to Farr's case because the law would inhibit 
the court's control of trial participants and hinder the enforce-
ment of its rulings. In fact, it went on to say that the legis-
lature had no bi!siness enacting policy which would prohibit a 
judge's right tu seek information. The ruling included the 
following state:D2nt: "To construe the statute as granting 
immunity to petitioner, Farr, in the face of facts here present 
would be to countenance an unconstitutional interference by the 
legislative branch with an inherent and vital power of the 
court to control its OHn proceedings and officers." (Pember, 
1984, p. 304) 
Still facing an indefinite prison sentence for the contempt 
of court citation, Farr was once again asked to reveal his 
sources. He again declined to reveal his source of information 
-
and went to jail on an indefinite sentence following refusals 
by both the California and U.S. Supreme Courts to hear the case. 
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Farr remained l',carcerated for a total of 46 days before the 
California court of appeals judge ended the contempt citation 
and ordered Farr's release. 
There are two interesting sidelights to this case which 
should be mentioned. During Farr's trial, the courts circum-
vented the issue of whether the shield law should protect 
former reporters. Although the courts sidestepped this question, 
the legislature revised the California shield law to prohibit 
courts from forcing former reporters to reveal information or 
confidential SOllrCeS after they have left their reporting posts. 
The second note is that another amendment made to the 
California shield law by the legislature was added which stops 
judges from sentencing reporters to indefinite jail sentences. 
-
CALDHELL V. u.s. (1970) 
A ~!~ !£E~ !!~!~ reporter, Earl Caldwell was covering a 
story on the Black Panther activity in San Francisco. CaldHel1 
had gained the confidence of Black Panther members and Has 
allowed into their clubhouse, where he subsequently taped 
interviews and took notes about Black Panthers. From the 
information Cald~ell gathered, he Hrote a series of articles 
about the Black Panthers organization which then appeared in 
the Times. (FLlncois, 1978) 
In Februar~ of 1970, Caldwell was subpoenaed by a federal 
grand jury "hiC", Has investigating the possible criminal 
activities of tile Black Panthers. The subpoena demanded 
Caldwell's notes and tapes, Hhich Caldwell refused to supply. 
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The reporter also refused to even appear before the grand jury, 
contending that his attendance at a secret grand jury session 
would ruin his reporter-source relationship with Black Panther 
members. 
Caldwell a~d the Times tried to quash the subpoena, but 
failed to do so because the summons was modified to a pro-
tective order which omitted the request for any unpublished 
i n for milt ion S l' C \ 1 red b y C a I d ,,J e I I a sap r 0 f e s s ion a 1 j 0 urn ali s t 
to be divulged. The modified subpoena greatly reduced the 
scope of the questioning of Caldwell. The new order specified 
two protections: 1) the reporter didn't have to offer any 
information about confidential associations, sources or infor-
mation he received, and 2) he didn't have to "anSlVer questions 
concerning stiltements made to him or information given to him 
by members of the Black Panthers unless such statements or 
information wer2 given to him for publication or public dis-
closure .. . " (Francois, 1978, p. 329) 
Another s;Jecial privilege granted by the modified subpoena 
Has t hat Cal d :' .. 1 I H 0 u I d h a v e bee nab 1 e t 0 con suI t ,-I i t h c 0 u n s e 1 
during a grand jury session to ensure that the court order Has 
being folloHed. The Northern District Court of California 
judge dismissed the motion to quash the subpoena because of the 
"shield" granted to CaldlVell. 
HOHever, CaldlVell still refused to obey the order. He Has 
cited for contempt and once again appealed. One of the reasons 
CaldHel1 stated for his refusal to testify lVas that no compel-
ling governmental interest had been sholVn by the courts that 
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would deem his testimony essential. 
Hhen Cald~Joll made this second appeal he did it without 
the formal support of the I!~!!, although the newspaper did 
continue to pay for his legal fees. The reason the paper 
backed out of the appeal, according to a memo directed to 
the staff and written by managing editor A. M. Rosenthal, was 
that when a reporter will not agree to authenticate his story, 
the paper had to remove itself from the case or "otherwise 
some doubt may be cast upon the integrity of I!~!!' news 
stories." (Francois, 1978, p. 329) 
I~! ~!~ r~~~ I!~!!, however, viewed the limited protective 
shield specified for the grand jury investigation as a positive 
step toward shielding journalists since it extended newsmen's 
privilege more than any prior court decision. The Times sub-
mitted an amicus curiae advocating a qualified rather than 
absolute privilege for reporters. The brief took into con-
sideration a balance between the government's right to be 
informed versus a reporter's right to gather news. On Novem-
ber 16, 1970, however the tide seemed to turn in the favor of 
Caldwell when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
lower court decision. In an opinion written by Judge Charles 
~errill, the following statements were made in defense of 
shielding a rQjl1rter: 
The c;\ S e is 0 n e 0 f fir s tim pre s s ion and 0 n e in 
which the news media have shown great interest 
and h~ve accordingly favored us with briefs 
as amici curiae. The need for an untrammeled 
press takes on special urgency in times of wide-
spread protest and dissent. In such times the 
First Amendment protections exist to maintain 




public with a wide range of 
about the nature of protest and 
(Francois, 1978, p. 330) 
After reviewing the powers of grand juries, the judge 
stipulated ne~ reasoning: 
Where it has been shown the public's 
First Amendment right to be informed would be 
jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit 
to secret grand jury interrogation, the Govern-
ment must respond by demonstrating a compelling 
need for the witness's presence before a judicial 
process properly can issue to require attendance. 
We go no further than to announce this general 
rule. Finally we wish to emphasize what must 
already be clear: the rule of this case is a 
narrOK one. It is not every news source that is 
as sensitive as the Black Panther Party has 
been shown to be respecting the performance of 
the "establishment" press or the extent to which 
that performance is open to view. It is not 
every reporter who so uniquely enjoys the trust 
and confidence of his sensitive news sources. 
(Francois, 1978, p. 330) 
Although tile application of this precedent was narrow 
and details of LtOH the government would go about showing 
compelling need for a reporter's testimony were absent from 
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the opinion, the Fourth Estate believed it had won a victory. 
However, the battle in this case Has not over. The government 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The court decided the 
CaldHel1 cases auld be joined with the Branzburg and Pappas 
cases, which ar\' revieHed beloH. The resolution of these 
cases folloHs l'l the next sections. 
TIlE THO BRANZBUl\G CASES 
Paul Branzburg, a reporter for the Louisville Courier-
~£~E~!l, ~rote a story about two unidentified people who Here 
synthesizing "~shish from marijuana in Jefferson County, 
"'-
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Kentucky. The story was published November 15, 1969. (Gillmor, 
Barron, 1984) 
Branzburg Kas subpoenaed by a grand jury which requested 
the disclosure of the identity of the two people he had wit-
nessed making the hashish, even though the article reported 
that Branzburg llUd promised he wouldn't reveal the source's 
names. The reporter refused to appear before the grand jury, 
and he justified his refusal stating that he was invoking the 
Kentucky shield law. At the time that Branzburg's case went 
to trial, ~~~~~£~~~ ~~ ~~£~~ ~~r~~, it was believed that 
Kentucky's law was an absolute privilege for news reporters. 
But the outcome of this court decision dispelled that belief. 
The trial court issued a decision stating in effect 
that the state's shield law protected BranzburB's sources of 
information but not the information which he had received. 
In other words, Branzburg would still be required to testify 
about what he hact observed personally including the identity 
of the two peop10 he had observed. This interpretation, then, 
made an importa:l~ distinction between a reporter merely 
o~serving sourcps and a reporter who received information 
from sources. It assumes that to protect the identity of his 
sources, a Kentucky reporter must obtain information from a 
source in addition to merely observing a source's behavior. 
After publiration of a story about illegal drug users in 
Frankfort, Kentucky, which appeared on January la, 1971, 
Bra n z bur g 0 nee a l' c1 i n f 0 un d him s elf the sub j e c t 0 fag ran d 
jury subpoena. He had reported information he obtained from 
tHO I-Jeeks of iIl~,_LvieHs \lith several drug users, and the 
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Franklin County grand jury demanded that Branzburg reveal the 
identities of tho drug users he had spoken with. The reporter 
again refused to oblige the grand jury with the information 
it sought from ~im. His argument to have the subpoena quashed 
claimed requiring him to testify would be an "incursion upon 
First Amendment freedoms in the absence of compelling Common-
wealth interest ... " (Francois, 1978, p. 331) He supplemented 
his argument by also claiming that he shouldn't have to appear 
before the secret grand jury since he "is required to go 
behind the closed doors of the grand jury room, his effective-
ness as a reporter in these areas (use and sale of illegal 
drugs) is totally destroyed." (Francois, 1978, p. 331) 
Similar to the protective order issued in the Caldwell 
case, Branzburg was ordered to answer questions posed by the 
grand jury about any criminal activity he observed, but it 
did protect hiD from revealing his confidential sources of 
informaticn. T'10 Kentucky Court of Appeals had again grounded 
its interpretation of the state's shield law which in effect 
rejected any First Amendment privilege to reporters. 
Bra n z bur g ,[ P pea 1 edt 0 the U. S. Sup rem e Co u r t . A ruling 
on these cases was issued by the nation's highest court after 
the Branzburg ~uits were coupled with two following shield 
1 a.,' cas e s . The verdict is included in the subsection "Trilogy 
o f Cas e s Res 0 1 \" cd. " 
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IN THE ~~!!~~ QI f~~~ f~ff~~ 
As in the case of Earl Caldwell, the Pappas case centered 
around a story about Black Panther activity. Pappas was a 
television neWSDan for a New Bedford, Mass., television station. 
On July 30, 1970, Pappas was assigned to cover civil disorders 
in Net, Bedford. In that city, Pappas was allowed to enter a 
Black Panther headquarters on the condition that he not reveal 
anything he sa~ or heard except for an anticipated raid on the 
headquarters by police. While inside, Pappas did photograph 
a Black Panther leader reading a prepared statement. Hotveve r , 
no police raid on the headquarters ever occurred. (Council, 
1973) 
Following his entry into the headquarters, a Bristol 
County, Mass., grand jury subpoenaed him to testify. Pappas 
did appear before the grand jury and answered questions about 
events which occurred outside the headquarters, but when asked 
about activitic~ inside the Black Panthers headquarters, he 
refused to testify saying the information was confidential 
and using the First Amendment as his privilege because Massa-
chusetts had Jl() shield legislation. 
The court struck down his First Amendment defense, and 
he was subpoenaed by the grand jury again, but this time he 
refused to appear, and the court judge ruled Pappas had to 
testify or face a contempt citation. Pappas appealed to the 
state's Supremo Judicial Court, \Vhich upheld the 10\Ver court's 
ruling and said the public "has a right to every man's evidence 
except in "excel'tional circumstances." (Gillmor, Barron, 1984) 
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.- Another important note in this court's ruling is that 
it rejected altogether the U.S. Circuit Court's ruling in the 
Caldwell case, saying that a newsman is like any other citizen 
and has no special privilege protecting him from an obligation 
to anSwer inquiries made by a grand jury or court order. 
This case was resolved in 1972, along with the Caldwell 
and Branzburg cases, in a U.S. Supreme Court decision, which 
is detailed in the following pages. 
TRILOGY OF CASES RESOLVED 
The Caldwell, Branzburg, and Pappas cases were decided 
by the U. S. SUIJreme Court in Paul M. ~E~~~£~E& v. John P. 
et a1. (1972). This decision was the first issued by the 
- Supreme Court on the claim of reporters to a constitutional 
privilege against revealing confidential sources of information 
or confidential information itself. The reporters lost their 
battle. 
The nation's highest court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that 
reporters were not exempted from the normal duty of appearing 
before a grand jury to answer questions relevant to a criminal 
investigation. In other words, the freedom of the press isn't 
infringed upon Khen reporters are called to testify before 
state and federal grand juries. 
In re VAN NESS (1982) 
This case is of particular interest because it defined 
the boundaries of California's state shield law in application 
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to freela~ce writers . The California Superior Court issued a 
. -
ruling stating tjat the shield law doesn't apply to those free-
lancers who have not yet made a contractual agreement with a 
publication or organization protected by the law. In other 
words, freelanccrs who pursue information for a story not yet 
sold to a publication or organization before the reporter 
begins the news-~athering process is susceptible to inquiry. 
So, only those reporters who have sold a story to a publication 
or news organization prior to gathering the information for it 
are protected from subpoenas ordering them to reveal their 
sources. (Pember, 1984) 
GARLAND v. TORRP (1958) 
------- -- -----
Reporters' privilege has also been questioned in libel 
cases. In the mid-1950's, actress Judy Garland brought a 
libel suit against CBS because of comments in a column by 
Marie Torre which was published in the New York Herald-Tribune. 
~1 iss Tor r e, in" TV - R a d i 0 T 0 day ," at t rib ute d c e r t a ins tat e -
ments to an unnamed executive from CBS. Garland's attorney 
too k a d e p 0 sit i (J'-. fro m Tor r e, a t IV hie h tim e Tor r ere f use d t 0 
identify the un~amed source, contending that revealing her 
source would violate a confidence. 
D~ring the L.S. District Court hearing, she continued 
to refuse to reveal the identity of her source and was held in 
contempt of court. She was sentenced to 10 days in jail, but 
was released on her own recognizance pending an appeal. Torre 
based her claim on the First Amendment, which was the first 
time the First Amendment had been claimed as a shield of 
--
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protection. Prior to this case, journalists used common law 
as grounds for their defense. 
In 1958, the Second Court of Appeals heard the case and 
agreed with Torre's attorney that forced disclosure of Torre's 
source might abridge press freedom by imposing some limitation 
upon the availability of the news. However, the court justice 
said that the freedom of the press was not absolute and must 
be balanced. He argued that freedom of the press is basic 
to a free society but courts armed with the power to discover 
the truth are also basic to free society. 
He also brought up the concept that it is the duty of a 
witness to testify and that this concept has deep roots in 
history just as does the freedom of the press. The obligation 
of a witness to testify and the additional right of a litigant 
to obtain judicial compulsion of testimony without question 
could impinge upon First Amendment freedoms. Therefore, the 
judge concluded that the court would not hesitate to rule 
that the freedom of the press "must give place under the Con-
stitution to a paramount public interest in the fair adminis-
tration of justice." (Francois, 1978, p. 328) 
Since the questions the court wanted Torre to answer 
were determined to be relevant in the matter of the suit, the 
judge ruled that Torre had no right to refuse to answer, 
although the columnist continued to do so. The U.S. Supreme 
Court decided not to hear the case, so Torre was incarcerated 
for a period of 10 days. 
It is interesting to note that in this case the judge did 
say that if the news source was of doubtful relevance to the 
case or if an attempt was being made to require many disclosures 
.-
of a newspaper's confidential sources, that he would have con-
sidered a different ruling. 
CAREY v. BRITT HUME (1974) 
----- -- ----- ----
The decision in this case ruled against a First Amendment 
privilege to shield a confidential source following the filing 
of a libel suit. 
The suit was decided upon in 1974 and the three-judge 
court took into consideration the Supreme Court opinions given 
in Times-Sullivan, Branzburg and the circuit court decision in 
the Garland case in 1958. The decision yielded the conclusion 
by the court that a newsman must divulge a confidential source 
-
in certain circumstances. (Francois, 1978) 
The action arose from a story by Britt Hume, who was a 
reporter for columnist Jack Anderson. The story reported that 
plaintiff Edward L. Carey had removed some documents from his 
United Mine Workers of America office supposedly to frustrate 
a government probe into UMW finances. According to the story, 
the plaintiff then complained to police that a box which was 
supposed to have contained the documents had been stolen by 
a burglar. 
Carey filert a lawsuit alleging he had been libeled by the 
story. Hume claimed the information for the story had been 
obtained from eyewitness observations by Casey's co-workers. 
However, Hume refused to reveal the identity of his sources. 
-
With these facts, the case was sent to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals. 
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The judge in the case cited the Garland case, noting that 
the court had balanced the freedom of the press against a para-
mount public interest in the fair administration of justice. 
The judge went on to say that the Supreme Court continues to 
cite Garland, which strongly implies that it has a continuing 
relevance and negates the inference that the Court does not 
consider a defamed person's interests as important. 
Therefore, the court ruled that the news reporter must 
reveal the names of sources who supplied information on which 
the allegedly defamatory story was based where the plaintiff 
had no other reasonable means of finding out who the sources 
were and where identification was crucial to deciding the fate 
of the case. The judge also added that identification of sources 
is especially essential if plaintiffs are to overcome the "actual 
-
malice" hurdle imposed by the Supreme Court as protection for 
the news media. 
CALIFORNIA v. LUCAS (1986) 
This case is a recent example of how a judge can devise 
his own course of action to determine shield law protection. 
In California, a San Diego Superior Court judge dropped a 
contempt citation held against KG TV news staff in November 
of 1986 after using an unusual approach to determine his ruling. 
The judge chose to interview the TV journalists in his 
chambers and after interviewing them, he concluded that the 
journalists possessed no confidential information which would 






J. H. Augus t, a KGTV as s ignment ed i tor, and reporter 
Steve Fiorina were subpoenaed after the defendant in the case, 
David Allen Lucas, was indicted for stabbing a Seattle woman 
in January 1986. Lucas had Fiorina and August subpoenaed 
because he sought information the station had gathered in 
attempting to find out the identity of an anonymous caller 
who had tipped off the reporters to the "murderer's" address. 
("Contempt Against TV Net-Jsmen Lifted," 1987) 
The two journalists refused to answer some questions 
they were asked during a preliminary hearing in February 
1986, and for that reason, the San Diego Superior Court judge 
who presided over the hearing cited the journalists for con-
tempt of court. In the ruling, the judge said Lucas' Sixth 
Amendment right to confront all witnesses against him out-
weighed the journalists' right under the California shield 
law to withhold confidential information which had been 
unpublished. 
The reporters were not sentenced, however, because the 
judge delayed tl1C procedure until the two appealed. 
A ruling from the San Diego Court of Appeals echoed that 
of the lower court's ruling. The court concluded that the 
material sought by the defendant was not protected by Cal-
ifornia's shield legislation because it would not disclose 
source names or unpublished information. The court also said 
its decisicn to rule against the journalists was reinforced 
because it decided that August might not have been acting in 
his professional capacity of a journalist when he gathered 
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the information in question. 
Acco:::-ding to the court, "No authority under the shield 
law protects a journalist's activities as either a citizen/ 
informant or a private investigator acting to assist law 
en f 0 r,c em e n t . " ("Contempt, 1987, p. 19) 
After staying the order for a few weeks, the California 
Supreme Court turned the case back over to the trial court 
where the suit originated. The following November, upon a 
request by the two journalists, a judge interviewed them 
privately in his chambers -- without attorneys for either 
side in attendance. 
The judge agreed that the interview "Hould not constitute 
a waiver of protection" under the California shield law, which 
-
guards reporters from being forced to reveal confidential 
sources. 
Following the interview, the judge decided that the two 
reporters didn't have any information which could have 
strengthened Lucas' defense. The judge also denied a request 
by the de~ense to revieH the transcript of the reporters' 
private hearing with the judge, saying that the transcript 
would remain sealed. HOHever, if the case is appealed, the 
transcript will be available to the appellate court. 
THE AVILA CASE (1985) 
This case involves the publisher of a weekly Spanish-
language newspaper in Union City, N.J., and how he used the 
state's shield law to protect him from testifying before a 





In 1985 the Hudson County, N.J., prosecutor announced an 
investigation into allegations that organized crime held a firm 
grip on the local Union City government. A grand jury convened 
by the prosecutor began to investigate the accusations and 
also check into rumors that organized crime was trying to 
have the city's police chief removed from office. It Has 
through this part of the grand jury's investigation that it 
began to look into the role of publisher Rene Avila's Spanish-
language newspaper -- Avance -- in connection Hith organized 
crime and Avila's relationship with an alleged Cuban organized 
crime figllre. 
The grand jury wanted to question Avila about his personal 
relationship ~ith a reputed leader of Cuban organized crime and 
another Cuban, who was Hell knoHn as a gambling operator. 
Through court-ordered Hire taps, the grand jury learned that 
Avila helped the cause of the Cuban godfather, and the grand 
jury decided to subpoena him to testify about his relationship. 
However, Avila invoked the NeH Jersey shield law and the 
First Amendment. He also tried unsuccessfully to quash the 
subpoena. Citing the shield law after Avila was ordered to 
appear before the grand jury, he refused to anSHer questions 
and even refused to identify his OHn voice on tape. 
Avila's arsument included that he could use the shield 
laH as his defense for not ansHering questions about his 
relationship with members of organized crime because he is a 
journalist 24 hours a day. For that reason, his defense con-
cluded that the shield laH not only protects the sources of 
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his stories but also all of his social relationships. 
The New Jersey shield law permits reporters to refuse 
to divulge a "source, author, means, agency or person from or 
through Hhom any information" Has gained or any "neHs or infor-
matioh obtained in the course of pursuing his professional 
activities Hhethcr or not it is disseminated." (Consoli, 1986) 
And although no confidential sources Here involved in the Avila 
case, the publisher was able to invoke the shield laH as 
adequate protection from testifying about his personal life. 
The grand jury finally alloHed Avila to not testify since 
h e \J a s n 't the U II eta r get e din the g ran d j u r yin v est i gat ion 
and Has never charged Hith any illegal activity. The grand 
jury also expressed its concern about the close ties betHeen 
- publisher Avila and organized crime and called for the Legis-
lature's close scrutiny of the state's shield law, which Has 
once considered to be one of the strongest in the nation. 
The appeals court decision in this case also set an 
interesting precedent in that it extended the state's shield 
laH to another ~roup of publications -- free-circulation 
papers, Hhich had not formerly been protected because they 
didn't meet the legislative definition of neHspapers. 
STATE RULINGS 
Although most rulings in shield laH cases have been issued 
by federal courts, at least seven state supreme courts have 
granted journalists a qualified privilege even though no 
statutory shield laH existed in the state in Hhich the cases 
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Here tried . (Overbeck, Pullen, 1985) 
. ,- In 1977 the IOHa Supreme Court recognized a qualified 
First Amendment privilege for neHS reporters in ~i~~~!E~ !~ 
Although the libel case resulting from several 
stories about a long divorce proceeding didn't turn out to 
bea victory for the press, the court basically adhered to 
the three-part test suggested by judges Hho wrote the 
dissenting opinion in the Branzburg case. The suggested test 
provides that a reporter can refuse to divulge confidential 
information in a civil matter unless: 1) the information 
in question "f,oes to the heart of the matter" of the suit; 
2) other reasonable Hays of gathering the information in 
question have been exhausted; and 3) the lawsuit involved 
isn't determined to be patently frivolous. (Overbeck, Pullen, 
- 1985) In the end, the Iowa Supreme Court decided that the 
three-part test had been met, so the reporter was ordered to 
reveal her sources. 
States other than Iowa have also recognized at least a 
qualified Constitutional privilege for reporters, and some 
state courts have even determined that reporters' privilege 
is to some degree inherent in their own state constitutions. 
One example of this type of ruling exists in a case decided 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Z e 1 e nl~ a v. 
This case resulted from a drug-related murder in which the 
defendant wanted to find out the identity of a source for an 
un de r g r 0 u n d n c \; spa per rep 0 r t e r 's s tor y . In the story, the 
anonymous source said the victim had been cooperating with 
narcotics officers. 
31 
In its decision the court did say that a journalist's 
right to withhold confidential sources of information had to 
be weighe( against the defendant's need for information to 
defend himself. However, the state supreme court ruled that 
the defen(ant had not shown that the identity of the source 
would have strengthened his defense, so the court upheld the 
reporter'~; contention that the source's identity should remain 
confidenti.al. (Overbeck, Pullen, 1985) 
In New Hampshire, another case also resulted in a similar 
ruling. The murder case, New ~~~£~~i~~ !~ Siel (1982), 
occurred after two University of New Hampshire student journalists 
wouldn't turn over to the court documents revealing sources for 
their story abollt the victim's alleged involvement in drug 
dealing. The ~cw Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a lower court 
ruling that identifying the sources for the story wouldn't 
have altered the judge's ruling. 
However, some state supreme courts have been adamantly 
opposed to granti.ng any First Amendment privilege to reporters. 
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to recognize a 
First Amendment privilege for journalists in Caldero v. Tribune 
f~~li~~i~£ (1977), a civil libel suit. The suit was brought 
after a newspaper criticized a police officer for shooting a 
suspect runnin~ from the scene of a minor crime. The defendant, 
Michael Caldero, wanted the identity of a source for the news-
paper's story during pretrial discovery, but the newspaper 
refused to supply it. The state's supreme court upheld a 
lower court's contempt citation against the reporter. 
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The Caldera suit was noted for the language in the ruling 
which, in effect, condemned granting a privilege to reporters. 
It stated in part: 
In a society so organized as ours, the public 
must know the truth in order to make value 
judgments, not the least of which regard its 
government and officialdom. The only reliable 
source of that truth is a press which is 
free to publish that truth without government 
censorship. We cannot accept the premise that 
the public's right to know is somehow enhanced 
by prohibiting the disclosure of truth in the 
courts of the public. (Overbeck, Pullen, 
~985, ]J. 213) 
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A~ALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The freedom of the press would be extensively compromised 
if it did not include the right to gather information in order 
to disseminate it. Therefore, there must be an inherent right 
to.a confidential communication network between a reporter 
and his sources implied in the Constitution's First Amendment. 
I believe that a reporter has a constitutional right 
to a confidential relationship with a source resulting from an 
underlying premise that society has a broad interest in 
the full and free flow of information to the public. And, in 
addition, choice based on the wealth of information available 
to well-informed citizens is one of the most prized ideals of 
democratic society; therefore, a free press becomes an integral 
part of the survival of a free society. 
I, along with many of the proponents for protective 
measure inherent in the First Amendment, wish ultimately that 
no legislation outside of the First Amendment be necessary 
to shield reporters from disclosing confidential sources and 
confidential information. However, in light of court rulings 
on the issue, I do not see that viewpoint as plausible or 
realistic any longer. The Caldwell case proved that the free 
press clause in the First Amendment doesn't guarantee immunity 
for membe=s of the press who receive information from sources 
in confidence. 
In fact, in the majority opinion written by Justice Byron 
R. White in the Caldwell case (Paul M. Branzburg v. Judge 




on the press in future decisions by claiming that reporters 
have no privilege different than those "of all other citizens." 
(Brenner, Rivers, 1982, p. 65) 
We see no reason to hold that these reporters, 
any more than other citizens, should be excused 
from furnishing inforation that may help the grand 
jury in arriving at its initial determinations 
Newsmen have no constitutional right of access 
to the scenes of crimes or disasters when the 
general public is excluded, and they may be 
prohibited from attending or publishing infor-
mation about trials if such restrictions are 
necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial 
before an impartial tribunal. (Brenner, Rivers, 
1982, p. 65-66) 
Thus, because the Supreme Court has ruled against 
a First Amendment privilege for reporters, I believe a 
federal statute protecting reporters from revealing con-
fidential sources and confidential information should be 
added to federal law books. 
In 1972, following the ruling in the Branzburg case, 
congressmen introduced 28 bills which drafted at least a 
qualified privilege to news reporters, and in 1973, another 
24 bills of this type were introduced. However, because of the 
diversity of the bills drafted by a myriad of media and 
journalistic orEanizations, no federal legislation was ever 
passed. 
The bills considered, which ranged from those providing 
a qualified privilege to those which offered an absolute 
privilege, brouGht up the same questions which have plagued 
every person who has tried to formulate a shield law which 






Perhaps the first determination in formulating a federal 
shield law is deciding who, exactly should be granted a shield 
privilege chat allows complete protection for a source and the 
confidential information provided by that source. Many state 
shield laws grant that privilege to newspaper reporters, along 
with radio and television journalists. Some of the proposed 
federal legislation extends the protection more generally to 
people directly engaged in the gathering of news, and some 
are so general as to include any person who gathers information 
for disseminatiull to the public. (Brenner, Rivers, 1982, p.68) 
There is a danger with such a broad definition because 
it would not include underground newspaper personnel, freelance 
news writers, locturers and book authors alone, but it would 
provide protection for any person who had an interest in 
public affairs and would give much room for abuse by individuals. 
The Avila case is a strong example of this potential for 
abuse. Rene Avila claimed and received protection under the 
New Jersey shield law although Avila had close ties with a 
Mafia ring leader. And although Avila's connections with the 
Cuban organized crime leader stemmed from a social rather 
than a professional relationship, he was shielded from test-
ifying before a grand jury because his lawyer argued successfully 
that since Avila was a journalist 24 hours a day, all his 
relationships were protected. 
Although the law must be strict enough to guard against 
abuse, it must be open enough to protect freelance journalists. 
-. 
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However, I would suggest that a privilege for freelance journ-
alists be qualified with a clause requiring they be non-fiction 
writers who must have previously published with recognized 
news organizations. This type of a clause is necessary to 
prevent situations such as the Van Ness case, in which a 
freelance reporter was denied a reporter's privilege because 
he had no contractual agreement prior to gathering information 
sought in the case. 
Therefore, I would advocate a more strict definition of 
who shoul~ be covered by a shield law by limiting protection 
to those news gatherers affiliated with legitimate news 
organizations which are recognized by the public. A bill 
drafted i~ this manner should specifically outline what 
legitimate news organizations are, but it should also 
definitely make specific reference to shielding the minority 
press, the underground press, the student press, and independent 
non-fiction freelance writers who have published work prior 
to the story in question. 
In addition, the law should be drafted with a clause 
limiting a journalist's protection to include allowing an 
invocation of the shield law only when a reporter is acting 
in his capacity as a journalist. I would word the law no 
more specific than that because a judge would have to make 
a final determination on the circumstances under which a 
journalists obtained confidential information; however, this 
mild stipulation would weaken the potential for the abuse 





There is another issue to be addressed within the 
question of who should be able to claim shield law protection. 
I think it is essential that a shield law include a provision 
to protect former reporters who are called to reveal a con-
fidential source or confidential information obtained while 
they were employed as a reporter. 
The Hilliam Farr decision is an example of the need for this 
type of clause within a shield law. In the Farr case, the Los 
Angeles District Attorney argued that Farr should not be able 
to claim shield law protection because he was no longer 
employed as a reporter. For that reason, Farr was held in 
contempt of court and spent 46 days in prison -- not a just 
punishment for a reporter who was prtecting his confidential 
source of information. 
The second major decision to be made in formulating a 
shield law is outlining what information should be protected 
by such a statute. Some state shield laws provide protection 
for confidential sources only. This protection is far too 
limited in that it gives no protection to confidential 
information either published or unpublished, and it also is 
too limited because a confidential source might be identified 
if the information revealed is known only to one specific 
person. 
A good shi01d law must not only protect confidential 
sources of information but also the information itself whether 
it has been published or has remained unpublished. The necessity 
of having sources of published information absolutely shielded 
38 
is evident from the Farr and Caldwell cases. Both reporters 
had been ordered to reveal sources of unpublished information, 
and both adamantly refused, and both were cited for contempt 
of court. 
Confidential sources of unpublished information also 
must be protected. Television reporter Paul Pappas was ordered 
to reveal what he had witnessed inside a Black Panther head-
quarters although he never I1rote a story on it but had only 
been allowed inside on the condition that the events he 
witnessed remain confidential. 
Another case which displays the precarious position of 
reporters held in contempt of court for refusing to reveal 
confidential information in a criminal trial is the Lucas 
case. In this case, the reporters finally revealed confidential 
information in a private hearing with the judge only so that 
the contempt citation, levied against them as a method of 
coercion, would be dropped. Reporters, when they offer con-
fidentiality to a source, they offer it absolutely; therefore, 
I don't think the reporters should have violated their confidence. 
HOl1ever, this is a prime example of the reason reporters should 
be granted privilege in criminal proceedings because the judge 
in this case determined that they had no information which 
would have helped the accused man strengthen his defense. 
Although not as essential as protecting sources of 
published and unpublished information, I would also recommend 
a clause in a shield lal1 which would also protect published 
and unpublished information which wasn't obtained through 
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confidential communications. The reason I suggest this 
additional shield, which could be qualified, is that govern-
ment officials could force the media to release photographs 
or film outtakes which could implicate individuals who parti-
cipate in dissident political demonstrations or riots. The 
qualified privilege could be stipulated by the government 
having to provp that it has a compelling need for the non-
confidential information it seeks. 
The third aspect of a shield law which needs to be 
examined when developing a~ ultimate form of legislation 
is which legal actions should be covered by shield laws. 
Some .. ould have a shield law protect reporters only in 
federal criminal court proceedings; however this fails to 
protect reporters who are subpoenaed to testify before a 
grand jury, and it also fails to include trial courts at 
a lower level. If reporters are protected only during 
trial proceedings, they could still be ordered to divulge 
confidential information by a state or federal grand jury 
or any other legislative or executive body which has the 
power to issue contempt citations. 
Th origilldl conflict about being forced to reveal 
information began with federal grand juries as is evident 
in the Caldwell case, but it spread quickly to state grand 
juries with the Pappas and Branzburg cases, both of which 
resulted in contempt citations for the reporters involved. 
At first, a proposed federal shield law might seem 
extremely unfair because it allows a reporter to exercise 
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a privilege not available to ordinary citizens. However, clergy 
attorneys and psychiatrists have special privileges in that 
they cannot be forced to divulge any information given them 
in confidence by their parishoners, clients and patients 
even if the information relates directly to a criminal 
activity including murder. Therefore, it is imperative that 
reporters should be able to invoke a shield law during any 
state or federal legislative, judicial, or executive agency 
to protect the sources and information which he has promised 
will remain confidential. 
The fourth aspect of shield law formulation should 
include privilege in libel suits. Because of the nature of 
libel cases, I believe a reporter's privilege in libel suits 
must be qualified. And as a guide to determine whether or 
not a reporter should be granted privilege in a libel 
proceeding, or even in a criminal investigation where the 
reporter is an eyewitness to a crime, I propose a three-
part test offered by the judges who wrote the dissenting 
opinion in the Branzburg case. In this test, it is qualified 
that a reporter will not be ordered to reveal confidential 
sources cr confidential information in any civil matter 
unless: first of all, the information in question directly 
relates to the heart of the suit; secondly, that all other 
possible ways of gathering the information sought have been 
exhausted; and lastly, that the lawsuit isn't determined 
by the court to be frivolous. (Overbeck, Pullen, 1985) 
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Through this type of a test, cases such as Garland and 
Britt Hume probably wouldn't end up a victory for the press, 
however, the clause should also include that a journalist 
cannot be jailed for refusing to reveal confidential sources. 
An alternative might be to have a source sign an affidavit 
swearing to the truth of the information he has provided which 
would remain sealed in the ~ands of the reporter unless a libel 
suit resulted. There is much division among journalists 
about this option, but it would deter sources from providing 
a journalist with false, libelous information about a person. 
Finally, and definitely a most important consideration 
when proposing whether or not to legislate a federal shield 
for reporters, if governmental officials and those in political 
office hold an unchecked power to compel reporters to reveal 
a confidential source or confidential information offered by 
a source under that condition, sources will undoubtedly not 
be willing to trust reporters any longer. Subsequently, 
reporters then will be deterred by the threat of officials 
to cite them for contempt of court and possibly incarcerate 
them, and futhermore, they will no longer seek and publish 
important information gathered from confidnetial sources. 
This will ultimately lead to a self-censored press. 
Therefore, when neither reporters or sources can rely 
on a shield of confidentiality, valuable information will 
not be published, and the ability of a democratic society 
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